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Using data collected in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, this article examines the
determinants of attitudes toward immigrants. In particular, we draw on the literature in social psychology to
explore the role of locus of control in promoting more ethnocentric and restrictive attitudes towards
immigration. We conceptualize control at three levels: (1) perceptions of individual locus of control (i.e.,
feeling that one can control one’s own circumstances), (2) perceptions of societal control (i.e., feeling that
one’s country has control over immigration), and (3) perceptions of an outgroup’s locus of control (i.e., feeling
that an outgroup’s social circumstances are attributable to dispositional rather than external factors). Results
show that all three measures of control are important predictors of negative attitudes toward immigrants:
Those who feel in control (personally or as a society) are less hostile towards immigrants, while those who
attribute negative outcomes to immigrants’ predispositions are also more hostile. Results also suggest that
measures of control are related to, but distinct from, both partisanship and racial prejudice.
KEY WORDS: immigration, locus of control, anti-immigrant attitudes, partisanship, racial prejudice
Immigration is hotly debated, particularly in advanced industrialized democracies receiving large
numbers of immigrants from ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse backgrounds. In many
cases, immigrants arrive facing economic challenges, sometimes due to lower economic status, some-
times (or also) due to barriers to economic integration within the host society. The diversity that
comes with immigration also stirs up controversy—it contributes to the rise of anti-immigration par-
ties in Europe, for instance, and more generally to public debate over societies’ ability to sustain social
solidarity in the face of increasing religious, linguistic, and racial differences between natives and
immigrants.
There is, accordingly, a growing literature on public attitudes towards immigrants and immigra-
tion. This work tends to focus on the cultural and economic factors that underlie opposition to immi-
gration including the possibility of employment competition and concerns over immigrants’
willingness to assimilate. Past research ignores important psychological underpinnings of anti-
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immigrant sentiment, however. In the current article, we seek to (partly) fill this gap. Specifically, we
focus on citizens’ feelings about control—their own and that of immigrants.
Our argument is as follows. Citizens who believe they are personally responsible for what hap-
pens in their lives, and by extension, capable of effecting change in society, should be less hostile
towards immigrants. These citizens are less likely to feel threatened by the changing social milieu sur-
rounding them. We expect that feeling “in control” of one’s own economic or social situation will
lead to more open attitudes about immigration. At the same time, citizens will be more hostile towards
immigration when they think that immigrants are responsible for their own misfortune. In other words,
the more citizens see negative outcomes as related to immigrants’ individual deficiencies, the more
likely they are to be hostile towards immigrants. In short, perceptions of control—as applied to both
citizens and immigrants—matter for attitudes toward immigrants.
There is a rich and diverse literature in social psychology, and to a lesser extent in political sci-
ence, on locus of control.1 Yet there is very little research that uses what we know about how people
perceive control to understand attitudes toward immigration. In this article, we rely on an online sur-
vey to examine the ways in which three types of perceived control influence anti-immigrant senti-
ment. The survey was fielded simultaneously to national samples in the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom. It thus provides an opportunity not only to explore the impact of control on pub-
lic opinion about immigration, but also to compare immigration attitudes (and the corresponding
effects of control) across the three countries. Results indicate that feelings of control powerfully influ-
ence anti-immigrant sentiment and that this effect is distinct from standard attitudinal predictors
including racial prejudice and ideology. We suggest that these control orientations are fundamental to
understanding attitudes toward immigration in industrialized democracies and that they serve as pre-
cursors (that is, they are attitudinally prior) to many of the dominant explanations currently available
in previous research.
Explaining Support for Immigration
Many native citizens of industrialized countries react with hostility toward immigrants and partic-
ularly the social diversity that accompanies immigration (e.g., Fetzer, 2000; Harell, Soroka, Iyengar,
& Valentino, 2012; Lahav, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010; for a review, see Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010).
Part of the hostility stems from basic group dynamics including ingroup favoritism and outgroup hos-
tility (Allport, 1958; Pettrigrew & Tropp, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), although ingroup favoritism
does not always result from negative outgroup attitudes (Brewer, 1999). Immigrants represent an
outgroup in terms of both nationality and increasingly in terms of race and ethnicity (Masuoka &
Junn, 2013; Pettigrew, 1998). Citizens are thus likely to attribute more positive characteristics to
themselves and their fellow compatriots and to view immigrants more negatively. This should be par-
ticularly the case when they are more numerous (McLaren, 2003; Outten et al., 2012) or their numbers
are increasing (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Hopkins, 2010; McLaren, 2003; McLaren & Johnson, 2007)
and/or when natives are more economically vulnerable (Quillian, 1995). In short, when immigrants
are viewed as more of a threat, outgroup hostility tends to increase.2
1 In political science, the concept of efficacy is more commonly used, yet efficacy and locus of control are considered
distinct constructs in the psychological literature (Bandura, 1982). Personal efficacy is related to judgments of one’s
own ability whereas “outcome expectancies” are judgments about whether one’s ability will have the desired outcome
or whether results are beyond one’s control (Rosenbaum & Hadari, 1985, p. 539). We are interested in the latter in
this article, although some authors have questioned whether they are both part of a larger core construct (Judge, Erez,
Bono, & Thoreson, 2002).
2 Of course, other identification processes may minimize the intergroup dynamic. Notably, when people have a shared
supraordinate identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) or identify with all of humanity (McFarland, Webb, & Brown,
2010), outgroups may be viewed as less threatening or not as outgroups at all.
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Research on immigration tends to conceptualize this threat in two ways: economic and cultural
(e.g., Fetzer, 2000; Harell et al., 2012; Hjerm, 2011; McLaren, 2003; McLaren & Johnson, 2007). For
the former, immigrants are viewed as either threats to individual (and especially low-skilled) workers
or threats to the economy more generally as a drain on the welfare state (Billiet, Meuleman, & De
Witte, 2014; Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Esses, Brochu, & Dickson, 2012; Hainmueller &
Hiscox, 2010). For the latter, ethnic, racial, and religious differences are seen as a challenge to the cul-
tural majority and a symbolic threat to the cohesiveness of the nation (Ayers, Hofstetter, Schnaken-
berg, & Kolody, 2009; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Ford, 2011; McLaren & Johnson, 2007).3
There is a growing evidence confirming that both economic and cultural threats drive anti-
immigration attitudes and that the effects are similar across immigrant-receiving countries (e.g., Citrin
& Sides, 2008; Iyengar et al., 2013).
Less is known about how other individual psychological predispositions influence anti-immigrant
sentiment. That said, there is a body of work that highlights ways in which certain ideological and
value orientations may be associated with prejudicial thinking and punitive reactions to outgroups.
For instance, work in psychology points to Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right-Wing
Authoritarianism (RWA) as two traits that can affect reactions to outgroups such as immigrants
(Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Costello & Hodson, 2011; Kupper, Wolf, & Zick, 2010; Thomsen, Green, &
Sidanius, 2008).4 Note that these attributes do not replace hypotheses based on intergroup threat but
enrich them. For example, Costello and Hodson (2011) show that people with higher levels of SDO
are prone to be more punitive toward immigrants when confronted with both economic and cultural
threats. In other words, people who have more rigid beliefs about social stratification are particularly
hostile to immigrants, especially when they are portrayed as posing a threat to mainstream society.
Our argument follows a similar path, although we want to suggest the importance of a (related
but) different psychological orientation that thus far has been greatly undervalued in analyses of anti-
immigrant sentiment, namely, perceptions about locus of control.5 Locus of control refers to a set of
beliefs about the causal attributions of an event to either internal or external sources (Lefcourt, 1982;
Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Rotter, 1966). In its classic form, as developed by Rotter (1966),
it was conceived as a predisposition to view one’s personal situation as either under one’s own control
(internal) or beyond one’s control (external).
Collins (1974, p. 382) suggests that causal attributions tend to vary in terms of two dimensions:
(1) predictability versus chance and (2) situational versus dispositional attributes. The former captures
whether what happens to a person can be explained by a specific cause or is simply a result of ran-
domness or fate. The latter distinguishes whether it is the actor or the environment that is responsible
for any given outcome.
For intergroup evaluations, perceptions of control should matter to assessments of how threatened
one’s (or one’s group) position is, as well as how a person evaluates and responds to the outgroup’s
situation. Given the importance of both economic and cultural threat as dominant explanations of
immigration attitudes, it seems logical to assume that threat is in part a function of (1) how much con-
trol one has over the outgroup’s presence and (2) whether that outgroup’s negative attributes are
attributed to their own failings or to larger processes outside of their control. Past studies tend to sup-
port both these propositions. People who tend to view themselves in control (internal locus) are
inclined to be less threatened and more open to those who are different, compared to those who view
external forces as the source of their personal situation (Costarelli, 2007; Duckitt, 1984).
3 Note, however, that Sniderman and colleagues (2000) find no differences in the cultural distance of immigrants. For
them, simply being an outgroup member is more important than how different that outgroup is.
4 SDO refers specifically to a person’s belief about ingroup hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), whereas RWA refers
to a person’s belief in authority figures and valuing conformity (Altemeyer, 1981).
5 See Nicol (2007) and Onraet et al. (2013) for a discussion of the relationship between SDO and RWA and locus of
control.
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People also tend to be biased in their causal attributions of outcomes. A person is far more likely
to explain their own group’s positive outcomes based on dispositional characteristics and individual
fortitude, whereas outgroup members are more likely to have their negative outcomes explained via
personal weaknesses (Agroskin & Jonas, 2010; Fiske & Depret, 1996; Fristche, Jonas, & Fankh€anel,
2008; Hewstone, 1990; Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Pettigrew, 1979; Stephan, 1977). When outgroups
encounter economic misfortune, then, it is typically attributed to the personal failings of outgroup
members, whereas successful outcomes are attributed to chance. In contrast, the ingroup is viewed as
having earned their successes through hard work, while their failures are attributed to factors beyond
their control.
Those aware of the work on welfare attitudes in the United States will be familiar with this form
of prejudicial logic in attributions of the causes of poverty among Blacks. One of the dominant
explanations for harsh attitudes toward the poor generally, and welfare recipients in particular, is that
those who are poor do not deserve assistance because they are personally responsible for their plight.
Deservingness is determined by whether citizens think the causes of poverty for an outgroup are due
to internal failings (such as laziness, substance abuse, lack of effort, etc.) rather than external sources
(such as chance, injustice or discrimination, etc.) (e.g., Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Hunt,
1996, 2007; Smith & Stone, 1989; Zucker & Weiner, 1993).
These attributions for poverty are intimately tied to racial prejudice. Stereotypes about Blacks in
the United States are tied to stereotypes about deservingness (Appelbaum, 2001; Gilens, 1996; Winter,
2008); the reverse is also true. And existing work shows that external attributions can facilitate more
positive attitudes toward outgroups: For example, Gill and colleagues (2007, 2013) demonstrate that
when people accept external explanations, they are more likely to recognize the suffering of the
outgroup and to feel compassion for them. In other words, a belief in external rather than internal
explanations is associated with reduced outgroup hostility and increased support for policies designed
to alleviate poverty. Similarly, prior outgroup prejudice makes people more likely to express internal
explanations.
There are thus several hints in the existing studies that perceptions of control should matter to
attitudes toward immigrants. Work that focuses explicitly on the link between control and immigra-
tion is nevertheless nearly nonexistent. One of the only studies we are aware of is by Agroskin and
Jonas (2010) who use a small student sample to demonstrate that lack of political or economic control
is related to prejudice toward immigrants. Here, control was measured using a modification of Paul-
has’ (1983) domain-specific locus of control focused on politics and the economy more generally, and
the dependent variable is ethnocentrism, using prejudice towards immigrants as a mediator; the study
does not include the classic measure of personal locus of control, nor attributions of locus of control
to the outgroup under consideration (by which we mean here immigrants).6
There is good reason, then, for further work exploring perceptions of control as drivers of anti-
immigrant sentiment. Lack of control should make immigrants appear more threatening. Doing so
also requires, we believe, a consideration of the relationship between attributions of control and other
predispositions, like racial prejudice and political ideology. Prejudice is related to perceptions of inter-
nal control to outgroups, as the welfare literature clearly shows (Gill & Andreychik, 2007; Gill et al.,
2013), as well as attitudes towards immigration (Pettigrew, 1998). It is thus important to show that
perceptions of control are not simply proxies for prejudicial thinking.
Political ideology is a similarly powerful predictor of immigration attitudes (Chandler & Yung-
Mei, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997; although see Janus, 2010). Ideology and ideas about control are also
intimately related, with left-leaning individuals more likely to make external attributions for poverty,
6 Relatedly, a recent study by Teste, Maisonneuve, Assimalehou, and Perrin (2012) showed that people tend to be more
positive toward immigrants when they are given information that immigrant’s themselves feel like they are responsi-
ble for their situation.
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whereas right-leaning individuals tend toward internal explanations (Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph,
2011). We believe that feelings of control, especially personal assessments of locus of control, are
prior to political attitudes. (We acknowledge that they can be mutually reinforcing—one might adopt
a political party’s explanation for why certain groups are on welfare, for instance.) But we need not
establish a precise causal ordering at this stage, so much as acknowledge that any consideration of the
political relevance of perceptions of control requires evidence that they offer a contribution distinct
from both racial prejudice and ideology to our understanding of anti-immigrant sentiment.
In sum, our study poses a series of interconnected hypotheses that are tested in a multivariate con-
text within large, national samples in three countries: (1) People who feel more in control (either per-
sonally or as a society) will have lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment; (2) those who view
immigrants’ misfortune to their own failings (internal) rather than situational factors beyond their
control (external) will have more anti-immigrant sentiment; and (3) locus of control will predict anti-
immigrant sentiment independently of racial prejudice and political orientation.
These propositions entail three different conceptualizations of control. First, we measure personal
locus of control by measuring whether respondents view their own circumstances as being internally
or externally driven. Second, we measure how much control respondents feel their society exercises
over immigration, to capture what Paulhus (1983) refers to as a sphere-specific measure of control.7
Finally, we are interested in respondents’ perceptions of immigrants’ locus of control.8
We test these hypotheses in the context of three Anglo-Saxon democracies that are characterized
as liberal welfare-state regimes: Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Canada and the
United States tend to have quite distinct immigration regimes (Bloemraad, 2006). In Canada, a large
portion of immigrants are accepted on the basis of a points system that rewards immigrants viewed as
likely to contribute economically to Canada, whereas in the United States, it is family reunification
rather than economic skills that dominates eligibility. The UK immigration system differs as well,
given the United Kingdom’s colonial history, as well as its integration into the European Union, mak-
ing former colonial ties and immigration from within Europe as important sources of immigration.9
That said, like Canada, the United Kingdom has begun to adopt a points system that prioritizes edu-
cated and skilled immigrants.10 We expect that the three countries will exhibit similar patterns in the
relationship between perceptions of control and anti-immigration attitudes. At the same time, Cana-
dians should have lower overall levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, and (may) also feel more in con-
trol of immigration. This is because Canada lacks a shared border with the primary source of
immigration, making illegal immigration less of an issue. Furthermore, the well-know points system
for economic class immigrations tends to focus on skilled immigrants.
Data
The data come from the Race, Gender and Support for the Welfare State (RGWS) survey, fielded
online in July 2012 in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The original survey had
1200 respondents per country; though an additional subsample of 600 respondents was collected in
7 More precisely, our measure is intended to capture what Rothbaum and colleagues (1982) refer to as secondary con-
trol, and more specifically the subcategory of “vicarious” control, which refers to how “persons sometimes associate
with others simply for the sake of sharing psychologically in the others’ control. Vicarious control, then, is similar to
the phenomena of identification and deindividuation, in which individuals submerge a sense of self in order to
enhance a sense of close association with a more powerful entity” (p. 11).
8 These items are detailed in the following section, and full wording is available in Appendix A.
9 For a discussion of how the European Union structures immigration flows both within and outside of Europe, see Van
Houtum and Pijpers (2007).
10 For a review of the level and trends of anti-immigrant attitudes in these three countries, see Segovia and Defever
(2010) for the United States, Ford (2011) and Blinder (2012) for the United Kingdom, and Wilkes and Corrigall-
Brown (2011) for Canada.
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the United States in May 2013, bringing the total US sample to 1800.11 Each survey was fielded by
YouGov-PMX, which uses a matching methodology for delivering online samples that mirror target
populations on key demographics. For details on the sampling procedures and composition of the
YouGov online panels, see Vavreck and Iyengar (2011). The samples reflect general population char-
acteristics, with only minor differences between country samples.12
Our measure for anti-immigrant sentiment is drawn from a standard battery that includes four
items that touch on general attitudes toward immigrants, such as “Immigrants take jobs away from
other [Canadians]” and “[Canada]’s cultural life is enriched by immigrants to this country”. The bat-
tery includes equal numbers of economic and cultural items, and the scale is balanced with equal
numbers of positive and negative statements on each dimension. (Full question wording—for this
index, and for all other measures—is included in the Appendix A.) The final scale ranges from 0 to 1
with higher values reflecting more anti-immigration attitudes (Cronbach’s Alpha5.80). In addition to
the complete scale, for some analyses we separate the economic and cultural items into separate
scales. These items clearly capture hostility towards immigrants, and are often used as direct measures
of both economic and cultural threat. We simply refer to them here as anti-immigrant sentiment, our
outgroup hostility.
In line with the discussion above, we operationalize control in three ways.13 Individual Locus of
Control is measured with a scale based on agreement with two statements that are pulled from stand-
ard control measures in social psychology. The two items are:
1) Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
2) When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
Societal Locus of Control is based on a single question which asks, “Thinking about the immi-
grants that come to [COUNTRY], how much control do you think that [COUNTRY] has over the
immigrants who are able to enter the country?” Respondents are given three choices: almost complete
control, a moderate degree of control, and no control. Both Individual and Societal LOC are rescaled
to 0–1, where higher scores indicate more control.
Our third item measures how people perceive an outgroup’s level of control over their economic
standing. This measure of locus of control is specific to immigrants. It asks respondents to select the
most important reason that immigrants face economic hardship. The four choices include: (1) they are
unlucky, (2) laziness or lack of willpower, (3) injustice in society, or (4) an inevitable part of modern
progress. Unlike the first measure of locus of control, this item captures Collins (1974) two dimen-
sions of causal attribution. We can distinguish the internal item (laziness) from two types of external
causes: two external items due to chance (unlucky/inevitable) and one situational explanation
(injustice).14
11 The additional US sample was collected with a survey identical to the original, with the exception of the inclusion of
Hispanics as an outgroup in the prejudice question battery and in a question battery unrelated to this article.
12 The mean sample age was 48 and was 51% female. The sample was slightly more educated, ranging from 24% with a
university degree in the United Kingdom to 34% in Canada. The percentage foreign-born in each sample is 7.5%
(United States), 5% (United Kingdom), and 13% (Canada). Note that the Canadian survey was fielded in both official
languages (English and French). The English survey instrument was independently translated by three native Franco-
phone research assistants for conceptual, semantic, and normative equivalence. Any inconsistencies between the inde-
pendent translations were then discussed for consensus with the research coordinator.
13 Appendix B shows correlations between the three measures of control. There are some significant correlations (ranging
from .025 to .176), but associations amongst the measures are weak. We take this as evidence that our measures cap-
ture rather different quantities.
14 Immigrant locus of control is, of course, likely to be related to more general beliefs about how the world should
work. Those who believe that society rewards hard work may be more likely to think that poverty is caused by perso-
nal failings.
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In addition to the three measures of control, our analyses also include measures of racial prejudice
and partisanship. Racial prejudice is measured based on a composite score of racial stereotype items for
salient ethnic minority groups in each country. Respondents were asked to rate each group on a scale from
1 to 7 from hardworking to lazy and from dependent to self reliant.15 (See Appendix A for details.) Politi-
cal orientation was measured using partisan identification, recoded to three categories: (0) Other/None; (1)
Democrat or Labour; and (2) Republican or Conservative. This measure was only available in the United
States and the United Kingdom, so partisan identification is included in analyses for these countries only.
It is known that preferences on immigration differ by individuals’ ethnicity and country of origin,
with native citizens from the dominant racial group expressing more harsh views toward immigrants
than members of minority groups or naturalized citizens (Masuoka & Junn, 2013). We therefore limit
our analysis in each country to White, non-foreign-born respondents. We also include a set of basic
controls for sex (female5 1), education (university degree or more5 1), employment status (work-
ing5 1) and age (30 or less, 30–55, and 55 and older). Given that age, education, gender, and employ-
ment status are related to immigration attitudes (see citations above) and have also been shown to
relate to locus of control (Ross & Mirowsky, 2002; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2013), their inclusion
is important for isolating the relationship we are most interested in, namely, the link between versions
of LOC and anti-immigrant sentiment. We begin below by exploring this basic relationship; we then
revisit the models, taking both political ideology and prejudice into account.
Analysis
Perceptions of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Table 1 provides basic diagnostics—it shows levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in the three
countries, first for the full four-item scale and then dividing the scale into its economic and cultural
components. Separating out economic and cultural aspects makes little difference—in every country,
the mean for economic and cultural items is nearly, or exactly, equal. We take this to suggest that we
lose nothing by using the four-item scale and do so in the analyses that follow.
There are real differences in levels of anti-immigrant sentiment across countries—or, at least,
across the Atlantic. While Canadian16 and American levels of anti-immigrant sentiment are statistically
Table 1. Level of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment by Country
Canada United States United Kingdom
Mean SE SD Mean SE SD Mean SE SD
Full Scale .49 .01 .24 .50 0.01 .27 .64 .01 .25
Economic Only .46 .01 .27 .53 0.01 .31 .64 .01 .27
Cultural Only .52 .01 .25 .48 0.01 .28 .64 .01 .26
Note. Restricted to White, non-foreign-born respondents.
15 Blacks, Asians, and Southeast Asians were included in all three countries in the original survey. In Canada and the
United Kingdom, the three items load onto a single dimension (a 5.732 and .679, respectively). In the United States,
the measure works less well with Blacks (and Hispanics in the oversample) falling on a separate dimension from the
Asians and South Asians, so we limit our measure of racial prejudice in the United States to these two groups (Blacks
only in the full sample, and Blacks and Hispanics in the oversample).
16 Note that past work has found higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. We do
not distinguish between the two regions here, but note that in overall measure of anti-immigrant sentiment, they are
very similar. This is driven by somewhat more anti-immigrant sentiment in Quebec on the two cultural items, but less
on the economic dimension.
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indistinguishable, Americans and Canadians are significantly more accepting of immigration (p< .01)
than the British. This finding is in line with other comparative work (see citations above).
Table 2 shows basic diagnostic data for our measures of control. We have no reason to expect
higher or lower means for Individual LOC across countries, and we find little variation, especially
between Canada and the United States, although even this small difference is statistically significant
(p< .05). Attributions of Immigrant LOC also vary little across countries, and only Canada’s mean is
marginally different from the others (p< .10). Where Immigrant LOC is concerned, what really stands
out is the relatively low level of internal control attributed to immigrants—respondents infrequently
attribute immigrants’ poor economic situation to laziness or a lack of willpower. (This may in part be
due to social desirability bias, although this should be less likely in an online survey.)
Cross-country differences in Immigrant LOC nevertheless line up as we suspected, with Cana-
dians leaning slightly more towards external rather than internal accounts in comparison with Ameri-
cans and Britons. This cross-national difference is clearer in the measure of Societal LOC, where the
Canadian mean is markedly and significantly higher than both the United States and United Kingdom.
This makes sense: As noted above, a combination of geography and history allows Canada to have
more control over immigration than either the United States (with a porous southern border) or the
United Kingdom (given its proximity to the rest of Europe and Africa, as well as its membership in
the European Union). Respondents’ perceptions of Societal LOC thus varies across countries plausi-
bly, given the contexts in which these nations find themselves.
What is most important for our purposes is not the country-level means so much as the fact that
these variables all exhibit substantial within-country variation. (See the standard deviations in Table 2.)
Does this individual-level variation matter for anti-immigrant sentiment? Table 3 examines this possi-
bility. The table shows results from multivariate OLS regression models, first with all three countries
combined and then for each country separately.
Individual and Societal LOC are included as single, interval-level indicators. We separate out
Immigrant LOC into categorical variables, where the internal response (laziness or lack of willpower)
is contrasted with the two external explanations: injustice in society and inevitability or chance (resid-
ual category).17 We begin by focusing on the combined results in the first column. These results show
a clear connection between control and attitudes toward immigrants. Individual and Societal LOC are
negatively related to anti-immigrant sentiment: Those who feel that they have more control over what
happens in their life, and those who feel like their country has control over immigration, are less likely
to be hostile toward immigrants. Perceptions of Immigrant LOC also matter: When citizens perceive
the outgroup as individually responsible for negative outcomes, hostility increases.18 These findings
Table 2. Perceptions of Control by Country
Canada United States United Kingdom
Mean SE SD Mean SE SD Mean SE SD
Individual LOC .61 .01 .19 .64 .01 .21 .53 .01 .18
Societal LOC .52 .01 .34 .37 .01 .32 .27 .01 .30
Immigrant LOCa .19 .01 .40 .24 .01 .43 .25 .01 .43
Note. Restricted to White, non-foreign-born respondents.
aImmigrant LOC is recoded so that the internal response (laziness/lack of willpower) is equal to 1, and the other three
external responses are equal to 0.
17 While we combine “unlucky” and “inevitable part of modern society” for the “injustice in society” category here,
note that “unlucky” was selected by just 4% of respondents.
18 It is interesting to note that there are also significant differences across external explanations where those who link
immigrant poverty to systemic discrimination have less anti-immigrant sentiment compared to external explanations
that are more general (unlucky/inevitable).
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fit with our expectation that internal locus of control applied to the ingroup should promote more tol-
erant attitudes, whereas internal locus of control applied to the outgroup should produce the opposite
effect. These results do not change as we move to country-by-country results in columns 2 through 4.
Every LOC variable has a similar impact across all three countries.
Of the three measures of control examined here, Individual Locus of Control should be the most
stable predisposition and most independent of intergroup assessments. We likely have ideas about
control over our own situation before we have opinions about immigrants. Societal and Immigrant
LOC are somewhat different, however—each likely reflects some combination of (exogenous) ideas
about control and (endogenous) ideas about immigration and politics. (They are also related to each
other, although by no means do they appear to be measuring the same thing: The strongest interindica-
tor correlation is 218, between views of societal control over immigration and perceptions of immi-
grants’ control. See Appendix B.)
Table 3. Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
All Canada United States United Kingdom
Individual LOC 2.093*** 2.096** 20.106*** 20.102**
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Societal LOC 2.159*** 2.164*** 20.102*** 20.218***
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Immigrant LOC: Laziness/Unwilling .118*** .141*** 0.124*** 0.085***
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Immigrant LOC: Injustice in Society 2.106*** 2.064*** 20.120*** 20.098***
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Racial Prejudice .378*** .366*** 0.315*** 0.473***
(.02) (.04) (.03) (.04)
UK PID: Con 0.028
(.02)
UK PID: Lab 20.034*
(.02)
US PID: Dem 20.039**
(.01)
US PID: Rep 0.036**
(.01)
Female .029*** .033* 0.049*** 0.005
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Working 20.014 20.014 0.001 20.013
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
University 2.114*** 2.080*** 20.151*** 20.092***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02)
Under 30 2.048*** 0.003 20.083*** 20.061**
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Over 55 0.005 0.003 20.013 0.021





Constant .557*** .531*** 0.505*** 0.624***
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03)
N 3283 895 1296 963
R2 0.437 0.342 0.462 0.424
Note: Cells contain OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Restricted to White, non-foreign-
born respondents. *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001.
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That these measures of control are related to political attitudes may be a source of some concern,
at least insofar as our objective is to capture the impact of control that is prior to—or at least distinct
from—other factors. Note however that all models in Table 3 control for one or both of these political
attitudes.
The existing literature makes clear that attitudes toward immigrants are racialized, and so it
should be no surprise here that the racial prejudice measure has a strong and significant impact across
all Table 3 models. We note that bivariate correlations between racial prejudice and both Societal
LOC (2.201) and Immigrant LOC (.276) are significant (p< .001). In line with previous work, then,
we find that prejudice is related to perceptions about LOC. At the same time, measures of control
exhibit a good degree of independence; and results in Table 3 make clear that LOC measures matter
to anti-immigrant sentiment above and beyond the impact of prejudice.
Partisanship, too, is related to LOC attitudes. Table 4 shows mean levels of the three meas-
ures of control across partisan identification in the United States and United Kingdom. (Recall
that we do not have partisanship for the Canadian sample.19) There are clearly partisan differen-
ces across measures of control in each country. In the United States, Republicans are somewhat
more likely to express levels of internal Individual LOC than Democrats (p< .05), but their per-
ceptions of Societal LOC are significantly lower (p< .01). They are also more likely to hold
immigrants responsible for their economic hardship compared to Democrats (.36 versus .13,
p< .01), with over a third of Republicans choosing the internal response, versus just one in eight
Democrats. All of this is in line with what we should expect from those with a more conservative
ideology, of course; and we see the identical (and statistically significant) pattern across Con-
servative and Labour identifiers in the United Kingdom.
That said, partisanship accounts for only a small part of the variance in our measures of control;
it follows that perceptions of control are not simply a proxy for ideology. We have, indeed, already
seen this in Table 3. Models for both the United States and United Kingdom include partisanship;
LOC measures matter nonetheless. We take this as strong evidence that the relevance of measures of
control for anti-immigrant sentiment are not the product of their correlation with partisanship.20
Table 4. Control and Partisanship: Basic Descriptives
Individual LOC Societal LOC Immigrant LOCa
United States
Democrat 0.60 (.01) 0.46 (.01) .13 (.02)
Republican 0.69 (.01) 0.33 (.02) .36 (.02)
Other/None 0.63 (.01) 0.32 (.01) .22 (.02)
United Kingdom
Conservative 0.57 (.01) 0.22 (.02) .33 (.03)
Labour 0.50 (.01) 0.28 (.02) 22 (.02)
Other/None 0.53 (.01) 0.28 (.02) .21 (.02)
Note. Cells contain mean values for measures of control with standard error in parentheses. Restricted to White, non-
foreign-born respondents.
aImmigrant Locus of Control was recoded where the internal response (laziness/lack of willpower) was coded 1, and the
other three external responses were coded 0.
19 We do have other measures of political ideology, including a scale of economic conservatism (based on questions
about redistribution) and a scale of social conservatism (based on questions about gender roles). These questions show
roughly similar results to what we see for party ID, however, and so we focus just on the latter here.
20 Note that comparing models both with and without partisanship suggests the following: In the United Kingdom, add-
ing partisanship has almost no impact on the size of LOC coefficients; in the United States, adding partisanship
strengthens the estimated impact of Individual LOC, while slightly decreasing the magnitude of other coefficients.
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The other control variables in Table 3 perform largely as expected, with younger and more edu-
cated respondents reporting lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (p< .001). We also find evi-
dence that women show slightly higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment.21
Conclusions
This study is one of the first to examine how perceptions of control—namely the extent to which
citizens view themselves, their society, and others as responsible for their own circumstances—influ-
ence anti-immigrant sentiment. We have relied on a range of indicators that draw on the diverse con-
ceptualizations of locus of control. Our results clearly show that perceptions of control are related to
anti-immigrant sentiment.
Feeling in control, we argue, makes it psychologically easier for people to deal with the changing
social landscape in their environment because they feel capable of responding to these changes. It fol-
lows that promoting internal locus of control—in both its Individual and Societal forms—is a potential
counter to anti-immigrant sentiment. The cross-national variation in measures of control examined
here suggests that they are not immune to context. That said, we cannot easily account for the cross-
national variation here—we have only three countries and thus limited leverage over cross-national
questions. Future research should nevertheless seek to explore how context—in particular, policy con-
text—might lead to more internally focused perceptions of control.
Our results suggest that attributions of control matter when applied to outgroups as well. Viewing
immigrants’ economic hardship as a personal failing exacerbates anti-immigrant sentiment. This per-
ception is clearly related to partisanship and prejudice, as we have shown; but it is also partly inde-
pendent and quite possibly causally prior. This finding is also related to a much larger body of work
on support for social welfare programs. Viewing immigration through the lens of control is novel, and
this perspective might serve to bridge the welfare literature to larger debates about immigration.
Future research should also explore the causal relationship between feelings of control, anti-
immigrant sentiment, and other potential predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment. While we have
argued that locus of control is likely prior to anti-immigrant sentiment, it is possible that attributions
of control develop in response to anti-immigrant attitudes as a way to justify not someone’s dislike for
immigrants (or other disliked groups). Disentangling reason from rationalization is very difficult, yet a
worthy goal of future research. In this article, our contribution has primarily focused on bringing to
light the relationship between locus of control attributions and anti-immigrant sentiment and to show
its distinctness from more common explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes.
The consequences of our findings for politics are relatively clear. Immigration is a policy domain
that evokes passionate responses, in large part because ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse
immigrants threaten (or are at least are perceived to threaten) the socioeconomic and cultural stability
of the host nation. Hostility toward immigration decreases when citizen (1) feel that they, and/or their
country, are more in control and (2) believe that potentially negative outcomes for immigrants are the
product of external rather than internal forces. Policy contexts that serve to increase internally oriented
views of Individual and Societal LOC, and public debate (i.e., media coverage) that emphasize exter-
nally oriented views of Immigrant LOC, will tend to bolster more positive attitudes toward immi-
grants. We know from past research that anti-immigrant sentiment—often conceived as the economic
and cultural threat posed by immigrants—is a strong predictor of immigration policy attitudes (e.g.,
McLaren, 2003; McLaren & Johnson, 2007), so understanding the sources of these attitudes should
have important consequences for public support for immigration more generally. These are the
21 Note, however, that the effect of gender is absent in the UK model.
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implications of the preceding work, at least. Our hope is that future research will be able to examine
these possibilities more directly.
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Appendix A
Variable Wording
Note that * indicate items that are reversed in scales.
Individual Locus Control
Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.*
When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
Societal Locus of Control
Thinking about the immigrants that come to [Canada], how much control do you think that [Can-
ada] has over the immigrants who are able to enter the country? (almost complete control, a moderate
degree of control, no control)
Immigrant Locus of Control
Immigrants in this country sometimes face economic hardship. Here are four possible reasons
why. Please tell us which reason you think is the most important :
1. because they are unlucky
2. because of laziness and lack of willpower
3. because of injustice in our society
4. because it’s an inevitable part of modem progress.
Anti-Immigration Scale (4-point agree/disagree scale)
1. Immigration is good for Canada’s economy.*
2. Too many recent immigrants just don’t want to fit into Canadian society.
3. Immigrants take jobs away from other Canadians.
4. Canada’s cultural life is enriched by immigrants to this country.*
Racial Prejudice
Where would you rate each of the following groups in [COUNTRY] on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1
means HARDWORKING and 7 means LAZY?
Where would you rate each of the following groups in [COUNTRY] on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1
means DEPENDENT and 7 means SELF RELIANT?*
Canada: Asians (e.g., Chinese) / Blacks / Southeast Asians (e.g., East Indians, Pakistanis)
United Kingdom: Asians (e.g., Chinese) / Blacks / Southeast Asians (e.g., East Indians, Pakistanis)
United States: Blacks / Hispanics†
†Hispanics only asked about in the oversample in the United States.
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Appendix B
Control and Racial Prejudice
Individual LOC Societal LOC Immigrant LOCa
Societal LOC .074***
Immigrant LOCa .025 2.176***
Racial Prejudice 2.024 2.201*** .276***
Note: Cells contain Pearson’s correlation. Restricted to White, non-foreign-born respondents. *p< .05; **p< .01;
***p< .001.
aImmigrant Locus of Control (LOC) was recoded where the internal response (laziness/lack of willpower) was coded
1, and the other three external responses were coded 0.
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